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1. Huizinga and the play-element in Greek culture.
"Culture arises in the form of play... it is played from the very beginning... it
proceeds in the shape and the mood of play": it is with these words that
Huizinga gave to play, that free, pleasurable, self-contained activity with no
economic or utilitarian aim, the status of a fundamental element in culture.
Since by "culture" he generally meant any form of human life entailing artis-
tic or intellectual elaboration, he asserted by the same token that play factors
are central in the development of knowledge, that is in the activities aimed
at establishing what is "reality" and what is "truth". With reference to Ancient
Greece, he took the sophist as a typical practitioner of "play-science", consi-
dering him as a successor to primitive prophets, thaumaturges and poets'.
Huizinga was not afraid of asking more questions than he could answer; so
the notion of culture he tried to construct could never reach complete cohe-
rence=. In Homo Ludens, the treatment of the relationships between "play"
and "seriousness" is, on the whole, as stimulating as it is baffling. Play is in-
separable from civilization (a term which is on an equal footing with "cultu-
re"); but not all historical epochs are equally "playful", and indeed in some
of them the original union ends in divorce for reasons which are never very
clear. The main question is left standing: if play is a creative force operating
in culture, why should culture relinquish it at all?
Huizinga's insights, nevertheless, seem worth picking up; not in order to re-
vise the description of play factors in Greek culture given in Homo Ludens,
1. 1. HuIZINGA, Homo Ludens, Boston 1955, 46 and 146.
2. The relevance of Huizinga's idea of culture for Greek history has been specifically discussed
by A. MOMIGI.IAN<O, "1.'agonale di Burckhardt e I' "Homo Ludens" di J. Huizinga", ASV SPisa, 4,
1974, 369-73.
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still less to attempt a fully-fledged recognition of the anthropological area of
play', hut in order to explore some aspects of Greek cultural evolution from
a (hopefully) different angle. Huizinga insists on the fact that play factors
were at work in the development of Greek thought; that some specific "culture
operators" made extensive use of them; and that some representations of re-
ality and notions of truth were elaborated thanks to this "method". This essay
will focus on some play elements in the specifically Greek concept of
sophia, originally meaning both practical and theoretical knowledge. The
main question is: why, after having held for some time a recognized status as
elements of Sophia, play features were pushed into a marginal position, and
eventually outside the domain of "real" knowledge? To attempt an answer,
the discussion will focus on: a) some specific ways of producing sophia; h)
the relevance among them of a particular rhetorical instrment, the fable,
and of its asserted inventor, Aesop; c) a cultural role which was played until
Late Antiquity, that of the Mad Wise Man. Eventually, some possible inferen-
ces on the separation of play from knowledge in Ancient culture will be ten-
tatively offered.
2. The play dimension ofsophia.
What is, first of all, the meaning of "play" with reference to sophia!
All along in Homo ludens, Huizinga features play as an alternative to "ordi-
nary" life. Contrary to any other human activity, play is pursued merely for
its own sake. It is however recognized as a socially relevant activity, provi-
ding pleasure to the community and often introducing constructive competi-
tion in it. A temporary secession from normal existence, it produces the fun-
damental contrast between seriousness, the mark of the constriction of the
outside reality, and jest, the expression of the player's freedom. Play thus
provides some patterns for experiment, innovation and creation.
Starting from Huizinga's general discussion, and keeping within the field of
human communication, the following attitudes can thus he considered as
forms of play:
1. Paradox: the deliberate distortion of current formulations. Questioning ac-
cepted views of reality, paradox also betrays a playful intellectual disposi-
tion, in so far as it accepts the risk of failing to alter the established order of
ideas, of remaining a mere individual joke which achieves nothing else than
the pleasure of being performed'.
2. Irony: the mode of speech where the verbal media contradicts the con-
ceptual message, in the attemp to produce new meanings by negating se-
riousness to the given reality.
3. As attempted, for instance, by R. CAILLOIS, Les /eU,X et les hommes, Paris 1967(2).
4. This is the Presocratic "tradition of hold conjectures and of free criticism" which has been
sketched by Sir J. P(wi,tut, "Back to the Presocratics", in Conjectures and RcJntalions. London
and Henley, 1972 ('), 136-55.
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3. Parody: the attempt to modify a previous utterance by partially repeating it
while introducing some modifications which affect the authority of the mo-
del and stimulate new thinking on the subject.
'1. Utopia: the representation of an alternative world.
I luizinga was well aware of the fact that , since Presocratic times, the sophos
is somebody mastering verbal and conceptual techniques . To state views ap-
parently conflicting with reality ( it can be added ) is the sophos' privilege and
duty ( nothing could be more directly opposed to common experience than
the opening declaration of Greek science , Thales ' utterance that all things are
made of water`) and this capability may lead him to express a radical and
self-conscious denial of the value of given representations and of current
procedures of thought . "Of all those whose words I heard " says Heraclitus
"no one came to unclertand that real knowledge (sophon) lies separate from
all other things"
Moving from Burckhardt ' s description of the agonistic temper in Greek civili-
zation , Huizinga also pointed to the play dimension inherent to the wisdom-
diffusing process . Although his wording was different , and made no specific
reference to the notion and operating modalities of the still largely oral ar-
chaic Greek culture , Huizinga was aware of the double original requirement
of suphia : an agonistic mode of elaboration and an hedonistic mode of re-
ception by the public.
'T'hese two play elements are strictly linked . Pleasure is a main vehicle of per-
suasion : Gorgias and Plato knew very well the spell -casting modalities of po-
etic and dramatic performances -. Gratifying its audience in order to instruct
them, the message provides an alternative to practical , daily-life communica-
tion: in other words , it opens up a play dimension . But this play must be
competitive . Truth is nobody ' s monopoly : it emerges from the comparative
performance of the various sophoi. The final assessment is normally rende-
red by the audience ( directly or through a jury). From the contest between
Homer and Hesiod down to the dramatic agones staged in the Athenian the-
atre of 1)ionysos in V Century B.C., competing messages of wisdom are thus
performed in front of an audience who are there to compare , weigh and gi-
ve final arbitration on the relative value of each of them.
The "sophistic" competition for "theoretical " sophia , which Huizinga took as
typical of "play-knowledge " in V Century B.C., obeys those same principles.
The competitors engage in an agon of spoken words : listeners are meant to
become engrossed in the argument in order to declare their conviction and
their support to one of them ; truth and knowledge are the prize of the dia-
lectical winner. Formally sound deductions as well as paralogisms , enigmas,
amphibologies , all are used as speech acts in order to assert the opposers'
5. "Thales, frag. 11 13 1, 3 Diels-Kranz.
6. l1eraclitus, frag. R 108 Diels-Kranz.
7. Gorgias, frag. 82 l3 11, 9 and 23 Diels-Kranz. Plato, Phaedrus, 245 a ff.; Republic, 595 a ff.,
605 c ff. The play-dimension of Attic theatre is aptly describen in Homo Ludens, 144-45.
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ignorance, and the wildest paradoxes are thus easily produced. Plato's
Euthy'demus attests how this display of verbal tricks delights at least some
specific audiences.
Plato's own capability to further exploit play-elements is proved by his Sy,m-
posion. The Greek drinking-party of Classical times takes place in a ritually
consecrated room, which has been separated from "ordinary" life and thus
designed, among other things, to create a "ludic space". Here "symposial
fight" erupts: often mere drinking-competitions, but also plays of physical
skill (such as the kottahos performed with drinking-vessels), singing of skolia,
verbal games, amusing enigmas (the c'riphoi)", and conversation on all sub-
jects. This agonistic, playful setting is chosen by Plato to have Socrates des-
cribing what could well have impressed most contemporaries as a truly un-
common, almost unreal, experience: the teaching of wisdom to him, a man,
by Diotima, a woman... "
Plato, however, condemns the sophists' orgiastic use of paradox. The eristic
disposition of these sophoi attests an "almost quixotic indifference""' to even
basic constraints of common sense: how could the sophistic style of word-
playing foster theoretical knowledge? playing, paizein, is one thing; search-
ing in earnest for the truth is another". Against the principle of play, Plato
intends to set the principle of seriousness in intellectual research.
But how does Plato carry on his project? Precisely by calling onto the stage
another sophist, the shrewdest of them all, Socrates. The style of argument
used by Socrates in an essential passage of Mende is fully eristic and the
foundation of sophia proposed in this dialogue pushes paradox to an appa-
rent point of self-contradiction. Having no use for the currently accepted re-
presentations and (mis) conceptions, the sage claims to know nothing. The
Platonic philosophical quest starts from a traditional assumption: that sophia
requires a paradoxical mood of expression.
Indeed, Socratic ignorance fits into pre-existing patterns. Heraclitus, again,
,,was quite astonishing (thaumasios) from his very childhood, since, as a
young man, he used to say that he knew nothing, and he claimed that he
had grasped everything when he had grown up"". The idea that supreme
wisdom might he owned by the most unexpected (that is, supposedly igno-
rant) person is an old one: within the Seven Sages, Myson, declared by the
8. The drinking party, formally dedicated to Dionysos , is a ritually self-contained society, a thia-
sos, (P. von der Muon , "Das griechische Symposion " = Kleine Schriflen , Basel 1976 , 489-90).
The notion of "symposial fight" is due to E. PEWLtzER , " Della zuffa simpotica", in M. VETTA
( ed.), Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica , Roma-Bari , 1983, 31-41.
9. See M. HALPERIN , "Why is Diotima a Woman? Platonic Ems and the Figuration of Gender", in
Before Sexuality. The Construction of Erotic Experience in Ancient Greek World . Princeton
U.P., 1990 , 257-308.
10. R.R . BRANHAM , Unruly hloquence . Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions , Harvard U.P., 1989,
77.
11. Plato, Euthydemus, 283 a.
12. Plato, Meno, 80 e.
13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, IX 5.
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Delphic oracle to be the wisest of all men, was a poor peasant in an ob-
scure village'. Socrates too, even before he had begun his investigation, had
been identified in the same oracular way as the wisest among the Greeks''.
At the moment, he could hardly believe it; but at the end of his life he had
become more self-conscious and told his judges that, instead of being pun-
ished for having undermined traditional beliefs, he was entitled to lifelong
public maintenance for having devoted himself to instructing the polis"'. By
uttering this ironical paradox, possibly the sharpest heard so far in Athens,
Socrates added a new version to the existing models of the sophos: the Mad
Wise Man.
In playing this variation to an old role, Socrates was also in tune with his
own times. For even representations of a world turned upside-down had
now become institutionalized into the collective capital of knowledge. Athe-
nian classical culture made systematical use of the literary form of the theatre
pl.iy, wonderfully suited to an oral communication system, and in it comedy
was certainly no less important than tragedy. The periodical dramatic agones
provided each time fresh messages of wisdom to the whole polls. Tragedy
achieved this by inspiring pity and fear, comedy by eliciting laughter; both
aimed at rendering the community wiser. Through tragic myth or comic pa-
rody, this specific form of play pointed to a "diferent" reality, and thus added
a new dimension to the audience's experience of life. Collective knowledge
was then fostered by performed fictions; play opened the way to serious-
ness; lies introduced truth. The hero of the Socratic dialogues, identified by
I3akhtin as the first seriocomic character in Western tradition, is akin to some
of Aristophanes' heroes, those burlesque sophoi whose methodical madness
finally triumphs over the wisdom of their opponents.
3. Aesop and play-knou'ledge.
This is the cultural framework where another bizarre Wise Man joins the
game of play-knowledge: the story-teller Aesop, first mentioned in Herodotus'
Stories".
Aesop's popularity in Athens in the second half of V Century B.C. is attested
by Aristophanes' comedies'". His name is from now on linked to the traditio-
nal strange little stories which, since Hesiod's days, had been used to en-
force an argument in discussion. The Aesopic fables are, broadly speaking, tales
where non-human agents (usually animals are enlisted) act as if they posses-
sed human capabilities, but, at the same time, obey their "natural" attribu-
14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives..., 1 106-8.
15. Plato, Apology of Socrates, 20e - 23c.
16. Plato, Apology of Socrates, 36 h-e.
17. 11 134-5.
18. Aristophanes, Birds, 47l If. 651- 53 ff.; Peace, 129-30; Wasps, 566, 1399- 1405 , 1446-48.
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tions'": the effect is an ironical reference to human reality. Aristophanes asso-
ciates these fables to the comic brand of sophia; and Socrates connects some
paradoxical modes of enquiry to the Aesopic way of representing reality.
In that most utopian of comedies, the Birds, a fable provides the relevant
piece of evidence in a discussion. The Hoopoe is suggesting an alliance be-
tween birds and men; Peisthetairos objects, stating, on Aesop's authority, that
any partnership between wingless and winged beings is contrary to nature
and cannot hold: at first the fox and the eagle established a very human re-
lation, friendship (koinonia), but ended up by wildly devouring each other's
babies"'. Always in the Birds, the fable of the lark has the same rhetorical
function (a "factual" proof): the birds are the most ancient beings in the
whole world, since, when his father died, the lark could not entomb him on
Earth, which did not yet exist, and had to bury him in his own head. Accor-
cling to Aristophanes, Aesop is once again the author of this little piece of
aetiological nonsense''. He can also he invested with the full authority of
play-wisdom: as a character of the Birds says, the fact of not being much ac-
quainted with him is a proof of being "ignorant and stupid"". In I Century
A.D., liabrius again describes Aesop as the specialist of utopian wisdom, the
recorder of events which took place in the Golden Age when men, animals
and plants spoke one and the same language-".
But Aesopic story-telling as a support for sophia is by no means restricted to
comic contexts. One of Socrates' verbal improvisations is a fable "as Aesop
could have told, had he thought of it"''. In order to point out the relationship
between two opposite entities, Pleasure and Pain, Socrates tells that, since
the two went on quarrelling all the time, Divinity, unable to separate them,
bound their heads together, the result being that whoever wants to get one is
compelled to take the other as well';. Socrates is making use of this fantasy
to describe a very paradoxical, but also real, personal experience (he is in
jail and, while massaging his leg which has just been taken out of the chains,
he feels physical pleasure taking the place of the previous pain: how strange,
hos atopon, he exclaims). Here is the starting point of a philosophical dis-
cussion of the connection between opposites: how can one avoid saying that
Simmias is both tall and small, and so on...-`. The Aesopic fable, here a small
piece of humorous aetiological research, is the first of a series of questions
on the real world.
This could leave the impression that the play-element has, after all, only an
19. Src M. N0Ir.v,vR1, La Fable antique, Kohenhavn 196-1, 68 ff.; and my Sa/x're e Paradosso
>u'll Aittichita, Ecopo e la %at'olct, Roma 1989, 224 ff.
20. Aristophanes, Bircls, vv. 651-53 .
21. Aristophanes, Birds, vv. -172---.
22. Aristophanes, Bircls, v. -+71.
23. Bahrius, Mi'thictnrhs, Prol. I, vv. 1-16.
24. Plato, Phaedo, 60 c, 1-2.
25. Plato, Phaedo, 60 h-c.
26. Plato, Phaedo, 102 h and if.
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auxiliary function. But this would not be supported by the wording through
which Plato describes the Socratic activity of inventing a fable: extemporary
story-telling in Aesop's style is denoted here by the verb enenoesen, which
belongs to the semantic field of intellectual production, of "thought" in its
full and weighty meaning-,. A bizarre paradox, then, has lead to authentic
knowledge; play has produced sophia '".
But the play-wisdom traditionally possessed by Aesop can only look whimsi-
cal to Aristotle. For the latter, knowledge must proceed from intellectual dis-
cipline and systematical research; logically formal procedures in philosophy
have no need of a fable as a scientific auxiliary. This attitude is all the more
evident since Aristotle can reproduce fragments of Aesopic narrative even in
works devoted to natural science. In the Meteorology, for instance, he quotes
in full one of Aesop's aetiologies, the tale of how Earth gradually emerged
from the primeval waters. By telling it, Aesop had gained the upper hand
against some shipyard workers who were laughing at him, possibly because
of his traditional deformity. Here the tale is reproduced to jeer at Democritus'
assertions about changes in the mass of the sea: a theory which, according
to Aristotle, is just as laughable as Aesop's story means to be 2".
So much for science, this Aristotelian creature; but what about practical
sophia? Aristotle is aware of the way an oral communication system works,
and how valuable allegorical devices can be in it. The fable, in this context,
takes the rank of a formal rhetorical instrument, beloging to the class of fic-
tional paradigms. No doubt, it is an instrument of practical persuasion, not of
theoretical demonstration, but it can he remarkably effective if the speaker
needs to address the common people, the demos (still the formal sovereign
of polis in IV Century B.C.)"'. To this effect, there is the need for the capacity
to introduce some tale suitable to the actual context; that is, to build analo-
gies between illusion and reality, "which is easier if one thinks as a philo-
sopher". One whole chapter of the Rhetorics consequently depicts Aesop
and Stesichonus (a name emerging from the wisdom-poetry tradition) en-
gaged in rhetorical action and using the fable as a weapon. Both are taking
sides in a political decision-making process. They are putting their good ad-
vice at the disposal of the community on a current question, an advice offered
against the predominant trends of public opinion which it tries to influence
by means of a deliberate use of paradox. In fact, with his tale of the fox and
the hedgehog, Aesop demonstrates that the very decision the Ekklesia of the
27. See the relevant discussion by D. SABBAmccI, 11 mito, it nto e la storia, Roma 1978, 199-201.
28. As in many other Platonic pages: Homo Ludens, 149-150 provides a first approximation to the
seriocomic in Plato's thought.
29. Aristotle, Meteorology, II, 365 h 10 ff. (the point is perhaps that all sea water would he sucked
in by Earth at the end of the process, and then shiphuilders would prove as useless as lane
Aesop, but still not as wise).
30. Aristotle, Rhetorics, II 20, 1393 h 8 - 1394 a 2.
31. Aristotle, Rhetorics, 1394 a 5.
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Samians was on the verge of adopting would actually backfire against the
true interests of the demos.
An as apparently frivolous utterance as the fable can thus leave its mark on
the most serious part of reality, the realm of politics: even for scientifically-
minded Aristotle, play and paradox can still, for practical purposes, and in
specific circumstances, open an exclusive way to truth.
4. From Mad Socrates to Aesop once again.
Starting from IV Century B.C., the Socratic model of enquiry has a large
number of followers. Among these, the Cynics in particular carry on the tra-
dition of a "critical" research, which opposes current beliefs and exhibits a
sophia well equipped with paradoxes. These particular Socratics appreciate
the analogical effectiveness of the Aesopic fables. They exploit their ironical
propensities and are fond of their characters, these animals which reflect hu-
man nature at its deepest and act as human beings would if taken away from
civilisation to the sphere of theria, the non-human nature.
"Socrates has turned mad", is Plato's comment at seeing sophia falling into
the hands of Diogenes the Cynic". The Mad Wise Man is back again: this
time, he plays havoc with traditional values and communal beliefs. He ne-
gates the status of the polis as the highest structure of civilization, and declares
the very notion of social hierarchy to he valueless (no revolutionary implica-
tion: no social system will ever he better or worse than any other one"). On
this basis Diogenes, sold as a slave after he had been captured by pirates,
can advertise himself as a master to the prospective buyers'. The real supe-
riority is the superiority of mind, that is the Cynic way of viewing the world
(and living in it), which scorns or inverts established values.
From the Hellenistic age to the times of the Graeco-latin koine civilization of
the Empire, gernerations of these special "Socratics" will play again and
again, with some rather unsubstancial variations, the role of Mad Wise Men
pouring scorn and abuse on all other practitioners of knowledge. Those
members of the sect who show a milder attitude, along the tradition initiated
in II century B.C. by Bion of Boristhenes or Menippus of Gadara, will also
make use of fables in order to impress some truths on the audience, by
means of little stories which convey their message in a pleasant and convincing
form. But in general a humourless harshness penetrates the fables used in
the Cynic perorations" to such an extent, that, in I Century A.D., Babrius has
to introduce his own elegantly versified Aesopic collection with the assuran-
32. Diogenes Laertius , Lives... VI 54.
33. See M.I. FINLEY, Aspects ofAntiquity, Harmondsworth 1977, 87-88.
34. Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VI 29-30.
35. See F.R. ADRAoos, Historia de la Fdbula greco-latina , I, Editorial de la Ilniversidad Complu-
tense (Madrid), 1979, 551 ff., 619 ff.
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cc that he has "softened the hard chords" of these reputedly "stinging ver-
ses,,
The fact is that the Cynics are not so different from their rivals. As all other
"lovers of sophia", by now, they take themselves very seriously'". Competi-
tion for wisdom is carried on by whole philosophical schools: Academics,
Stoics, Epicureans, and many more, and always with the Cynics as perennial
outsiders. But each sect is engaged in a perpetual fight in order to assert the
authority of its Founding Father and has no time for joking or playing. The
most Socratic of all traits, the perpetually ironical turn of mind of the Athe-
nian sophos, is now mainly a source of embarassment. The Stoics for in-
stance are ready to pay reverence to the archetypal Martyr of Philosophy', but
turn away from the paradoxical elements in his thought and indeed from any
flash of madness in the Wise Man'". Socrates' irony is unacceptable to Epicu-
rus" and his later followers; Cicero remembers how his philosophy teacher,
the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon, one of the most learned men of the time, sta-
ted his repulsion for the very idea of play-wisdom by means of an insulting
definition of Socrates: scurra Atticus, the Athenian buffoon".
Cicero admits jokes as a rhetorical device, but of course only in order to con-
vey serious messages to the audience on very specific occasions (the exam-
ple he gives refers typically to symposial conversation)'. In fact, general lack
of a sense of humour prevails among men of science of all schools. One has
to wait until the II Century A.D. for Lucian, a rhetor, to poke fun at all of
them. Rhetors can also he very serious, as befits pillars of the existing educa-
tional and social order, the best practitioners of culture entrusted with the
education of "elites". They call themselves "sophists", claiming that they are
in charge of the extant patrimony of words, of the whole sophia preserved in
writing since Homeric times; in this capacity, they are also entitled to prac-
tice the seriocomic genres. In I Century AD., Dio of Prusa writes "little plays",
pai, nia (the Sophist Thrasymachus, in V Century B.C., had used the same la-
bel for his collection of aporias), praising the Hair, the Parrot or the Fly (the
latter, a subject for Lucian too). These "second Sophists" are once more prac-
tising knowledge in its most verbal dimension, which again means, unfortu-
nately, its most self-satisfied and unproductive. The still existing creative pos-
sihilities of play-wisdom are exploited only by Lucian. He is masterly
however, and in his jocular style he attemps a wholesome reshaping of tradi-
tion, systematically parodying it. His renovation of the seriocomic genre is in-
36. Bahrius, MPthiamhs, Pro/. 1, 19; transl . B.E. Perry.
37. See L. JERPHAGNON, "Le philosophe et son image clans I'Empire d'Auguste a la Tetrarchie",
Bull. Ass. G. Bude, 1981, 167-82.
38. See A. RoNCONi, " Exitus illustrium virorum ", in Reallexikon fur Antike and C,'hristentum, vol.
V1, 1966, 1.258-60.
39. See A.A. LONG, "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy", CQ 88, 1988, 151-2
40. Cicero , Brutus 292 = Epicurus, frag. 231 tJsener.
41. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I 91.
42. Cicero, The Orator, 11 250.
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deed an effort to produce new meanings by playing with the old ones".
The solemn, often pompous, wisdom of so many professional Wise Men,
both philosophers and rhetors, has then called for a new flash of philosophic
folly. Lucian follows the learned tradition; but a similar reaction appears at
lower level as well. And the Mad Wise Man comes once more onto the stage
as the hero of a rough, vulgar but nevertheless philosophical tale, which
takes Aesop as its protagonist.
Aesop's features now take their final shape in a formal biography, the so-
called Life ofAesop, whose different anonymous versions seem to have been
worked out between the I and the IV Century A.D., crystallizing mainly in
the II Century''. This is definitely a "popular" tale. Neither in form nor in
content (particularly in version G) does it match the requirements of "high"
literature". Vulgarisms in word and action prove that this book did not in-
tend to fulfill the expectations of an educated audience. In the period of the
Second Sophistic, Graeco-Latin fiction is normally written according to the
taste of the pepaideumenos, the cultivated if not thouroughly learned gentle-
man: the Life of Aesop has been recognized as the only exception in taking
the opposite view,"'.
Still, remnants of a learned tradition lurk behind the plebeian coarseness.
The biography faithfully relates the tale of Aesop's death in Delphi, a feature
already well known to Herodotus and Aristophanes-. It includes anecdotes
and utterances typical of traditional sophia and even his contamination with
the old Oriental Romance of Ahigar (a courtly literary production, by the
way, no popular piece of oral narrative) could betray Classical influences";
finally, Aesop, an expert in play-wisdom, is here the supreme sage. The man
is given to rhetorical agones, verbal jousts fought mainly against his philo-
sopher-master Xanthos. He is skilled at resolving enigmas and at playing
with words, and always ready to strike at his dialectic opponent with an
unexpected pointe, which will put the laughing audience on his side.
This character can also be considered as an outcome of the deliberate vulga-
rization of the Socratic tradition by generations of Cynic street-preachers".
True to this philosophical bent, he keeps an outsider's view on contempo-
rary culture and education (this fits well with the tradition making him a
non-Greek by birth). A second Socrates, he is spiritually attractive despite his
43. BRANI IAM, Unntly Eloquence, 211-15.
44. J.J. WINKLER, Auctor and Actor. A narratological Reading ofApuleius:c Golden Ass, University
of California Press, 1985, 279.
45. See A. LA PENNA, "II Romanzo d'Esopo", Athenaeum N.S. 40, 1962, 265-66; and also WINKLER,
Auctor and Actor, 280-82.
46. G. ANDERSON, The Novel in the Graeco-Roman World, London-Sydney-Totowa, 1984, 50-51
and 101.
47. Herodotus, Stories, II 13-+-5; Aristophanes Wasps, vv. 1,146-48.
48. The relevance of Ahiyar in V Century B.C. Greek Culture is highlighted by M.J. LUZZA1TO,
"Grecia e vicino Oriente: tracce della "Storia di Ahiyar nella cultura greca tra VI e V secolo
a.C.", Quaderni di Storia XVIII-36, 1992, 5-84.
49. Sapere e Paradosso..., 205-12.
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ugliness, and has the ability to bring out the ignorance of so-called learned
people; a second Diogenes, he is sold as a slave on a market-place, where
he warns his prospective acquirers that he "knows nothing" (another Socratic
trait) and causes his buyer, Xanthos, a professor of philosophy, to burst out:
"I bought myself a master!"s°. Both ancestors have endowed him with an es-
sentially ambiguous outlook: "the jug is modest, the wine is good"".
This living paradox plays all the time; with words and sentences, with riddles
and enigmas, and with his master as a cat with the mouse. Any triumph of
Aesop's spontaneous wisdom over the ostentatious knowledge of the profes-
sional philosopher is greeted with applause and laughter by Xanthos' paying
disciples, who forget any social and cultural solidarity with their teacher12
(they are all members of the same affluent class'') and demand that Aesop
be admitted in their symposion": the superiority of play-sophia is then fully
vindicated.
"This slave will drive me crazy!"". Xanthos is right. The Mad Wise Man is ful-
filling his mission once more: exploding sham sophia, asserting the true one.
Sophia is to he taken here in its archaic, totalitarian meaning. Aesop's ex-
ploits are not limited to showing the vacuity of the professional assertions or
bringing to light substantial ignorance; they are also directly relevant on the
level of morality and politics. Aesop's behaviour unmasks the ugly aspects of
Xanthos' personality (nastiness, revengefulness, lack of self-control and of in-
ner dignity), all inadmissible in a true'philosopher. Contradicting the old tra-
dition of sophia as well as current expectations in Roman times"), Xanthos,
the representative of the social and intellectual elite, proves to be good for
nothing as a foreign invasion threatens the city (Samos). Shrewd advice and
public safety come only from Aesop, who, after being initially greeted in the
Assembly by an outburst of laughter, gains the status of a saviour of the
community by the end: For a moment, the image of the independent polis of
Classical times, the echo of Aristotle's appreciation of the political relevance
of Aesop's wisdom, has come back to lifer'.
50. Aesop is sold and bought at market: Life, chap. 23; becomes the master of his master: 28
(both are Diogenic features: see Diogenes Laertius, Lives..., VI 29-30); is an expert in guess-
play: 47-48; plays on double-meanings: 38, 39, 40, 44-50, 65, 68-73. For the strong Cynic fea-
tures of this character, see also H. ZEITZ, "Der Aesoproman and seine Geschichte", Aegyptus
14, 1936, 230 ff.; A. LA PENNA, "Il Romanzo d"Esopo" (Aesop's wisdom is here - p. 291 - ex-
plicitely linked with Huzinga's idea of a ludic knowledge: this is the starting-point of this es-
say); F.R. ADRADOS, Historia..., 680-96; Sapere e Paradosso..., 116-27.
51. Life, chap. 27. WINKLER, Auctor and Actor, 277 ff. sees Aesop's comic ugliness as a specific
"provocation to thought".
52. Life G, chapp. 26, 48, 52, 53.
53. Life W, chap. 20.
54. Life G, chap. 47.
55. Life, chap. 43.
56. See in gen. G.W. BOWERSOCK, Greek .Sophists in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1969.
57. Life, chap. 81-100. Aristotle's appreciation is expressed, not only in the Rhetorics, but also in
his Constitution of the .Samians (Aristotle, fragg. 611, 33 and 473 Rose).
1 0 Stefano ledrkicwicz
5. Onefinal assessment (?fplay-u'isdlom.
Plutarch knows too that Aesop could occasionally he a political orators". And
at first sight, his Dinner of the Seven Sages, where Aesop is a relevant charac-
ter, looks like an additional confirmation of the reappraisal of play-wisdom
apparently made on different cultural levels in I-II centuries A.D. But in fact
this dialogue makes an ambiguous evaluation of the play dimension in
knowledge and of his representative.
Aesop comes to grips here with the great representatives of Presocratic wis-
dom, Thales, Bias, Pittakos, Solon, Chilon, Kleoboulos and Anacharsis, in a
flow of relaxed yet lively discussion where, in the noblest symposial tradi-
tion, humour, jokes and laughter intermingle with seriousness and erudition.
In this circle Aesop holds his place quite honorably; he knows how to take
part in the exchange of views in good old eristic style"' and displays the re-
quired amount of polemical wittiness, which amuses the whole company
(everybody laughs, while he laughs too, jests, and is amiably laughed at""). If
he could be considered as wise as he is funny, he would truly embody once
again the tradition of play-wisdom.
But in Plutarch's Dinner there is in fact more play than wisdom on Aesop's
side. What is his personal status in the symposion? He is certainly not one of
the Seven; he is placed in a definitely diminutive position, since he does not
lie on a bed, as everybody else, hut sits down on "a very low stool" at So-
lon's feet (so that Solon is able to lay his hand on Aesop's head)"'. This is a
second-class place reserved for waiters, children or women (Kleoboulos'
daughter, Kleobouline, sits down in the same way)". And what is the weight
of Aesop's own wisdom in the general context? The sophia expressed in the
fables is praised as being "multicoloured and poliphonic" `"; but it is clearly
stated that Aesop did not invent it: he learned it from Hesiod. Moreover, Ae-
sop is blamed by Anacharsis (apparently as wise a Barbarian as he is him-
self), for concentrating only on quick witticisms and thus being unable to
understand constructively "true wisdom"'; he has little to say about, and
seems to have quite an inadequate idea of, the political wisdom which is put
forward by the Seven"; he has nothing to add,to the definitions given by all
participants in their typical short sentences (gnomai)"'. True, as a final show
58. Plutarch, Old Men in Public Affairs, 790 c-d.
59. Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven Sages, 7, 152 b: Aesop can speak elegtikos.
60. Plutarch, Dinner..., 5, 152 c; 8, 152 e; 10, 154 c; 11, 154 f; 12, 155 b; 21, 164 b.
61. Plutarch, Dinner..., 4, 150 a-h and 7, 152 c.
62. To sit down at a dinner-party (instead of lying on a bed) is a sign of social inferiority since
the Classical times in the Greek world: see J'H. DENTZER, Le motif du Diner couche dais le
proche Orient et le monde grec, Roma 1982, 426 and 432.
63. Plutarch, Dinner..., 14, 158 h.
64. Plutarch, Dinner..., 12, 155 a-b.
65. Plutarch, Dinner..., 7, 152 a-e.
66. Plutarch, Dinner..., 8, 153 a; 9, 153 c-d; 12, 155 d-e.
The last Champion of Play-Wisdom: Aesop 127
of sympathy towards play-wisdom, Plutarch gives the fabulist the task of clo-
sing the symposion. Aesop aptly quotes Homeric verses in order to illustrate
some of the Seven's sayings, but he calls the statement, made by another
participant, that his own fables might exert the same authority, "a joke". In
other words, Plutarch has Aesop admitting that his own brand of wisdom
cannot hold the same status as Homeric poetry67'.
Plutarch evidently enjoys quoting Aesop's tales and utterances, but he seems
to consider them more as a passive object than as an active instrument of
"scientific" research (the same attitude might have inspired all the erudite or
educational fable-collecting activity, which went on till the end of Antiquity
after the first Aesopica edited, around the turn of IV Century B.C., by Deme-
trius of Phaleron). Plutarch is, too, a man of his times: times where an increas-
ingly academic and formalized knowledge set down in books can be ac-
quired only by members of a social elite using an institutional system of
education: the one which, in the Life ofAesop, Xanthos' disciples are possibly
paying for. But, according to the views of the non-Plutarchian Aesop, those
people might just be wasting their money. This Aesop cares for sophia, not
for social prestige and wealth. Xanthos' academic, elitist learning ("I have
been schooled in Athens by philosophers, rhetors, grammarians!" he boasts59)
is something to be disposed of.
In his still Socratic approach, Aesop might have a point. From Hellenistic
times onwards, culture is increasingly made up of a mass of theories, of a
polvniathia heaped up through centuries. This is an era of compilations, and
of compilations of compilations. What about old Heraclitus's warning, that
polhmuthiu, "knowing a lot of things", does not give understanding by it-
Self" In II Century A.D. Aulus Gellius remembers these words so well, that
he quotes them... in the first pages of his own encyclopaedia, the Attic
Nights. Such a knowledge can still be a kind of game, a lulus: Gellius has
been working, as he declares, mainly for his own and his readers' pleasure,
and in fact he is aiming at collection erudite curiosities''. But this playful dis-
position coexists quite well with the prevailing idea of knowledge: less a vo-
cation investing the whole of the personality and way of life of the philosop-
hos, the knowledgelover, than the daily exploitation of a bookishly prefabri-
cated list of statements, a prerequisite for a career, and a living for the largest
crowd of professors ever seen in the Ancient world. Only the very best of
them, like Lucian, have the courage to adopt the view that culture is some-
thing one should play with, not only for pleasure but also in order to pre-
serve its vitality'.
67-68. Plutarch, Dinner..., 21, 164 h-c.
69. Lti, G, chap. 36.
70. Heraclitus, frag. 22 13 12, 40 Diels-Kranz.
71. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, Introduction, 12-13.
72. Within Latin narrative of 1-11 centuries A.D., this consciousness might also have been shared
by highly learned authors such as Petronius and Apuleius (see WINKLER, Auctor and Actor,
1 28 Stefano Jedrkirwicz
Could then Lucian be in the position to appreciate the full value of Aesop as
the representative of a ludic wisdom tradition? No. It is Gellius, who, cohe-
rently with his own hedonistic notion of culture (more fun than wisdom,
once again), sees Aesop's fables as the easy and pleasant way to "truth", by
which he means, however, nothing more than some philosophical truism-'.
But Lucian is even more patronizing than Plutarch. In the imaginary sympo-
sion in the Isle of the Blest, Aesop is nothing else than a gelotopoios, a pro-
fessional jester of low social level, whose function is to make people laugh,
and not think-'. Why is he given such a diminutive treatment?
Even for Lucian "culture" is tantamount to the literate and literary tradition,
access to which must necessarily be restricted to a selected public. In some
cases, this public may duly appreciate Aesopic fables as a specific allegorical
device. But the kind of "alternative culture" which is offered by the anti-aca-
detnic Aesop of the Life is of a different kind. It is unfortunately made up
only of fragments of what was once knowledge; a repertory of more or less
amusing curiosities or sheer trivia; puns, witticisms, some worn-out bouts of
antifeminist satire, dialectical tricks (the remnants of an old tradition of anti-
logies or verbal jokes, such as the riddle of "the best and worse thing", the
tongue, or the paradox of "drinking out the sea", which are common both to
the Life and to Plutarch's Dinner's). All these can mean Sophia only to people
having been excluded from the formal educational process which is now re-
quired to form cultivated gentlemen, pepaideumenoi or uiri civiliter eruditi,
persons like Lucian, Gellius, and their intended audiences. A mere survivor
of the old oral communication system of Classical times, this "wisdom" now
finds its agonistic accomplishment in the almost clownish performances of
street-philosophers of the Cynic tribe (the ones ridiculed by Lucian). This is
the maximum which can be bestowed to the masses by the "Popularphilo-
sophie", that form of third or fourth-hand acculturation which, to quote for a
last time Huizinga's words echoing Dio of Prusa, "turned the heads of slaves
and sailors with (an) hodge-podge of aphorisms, wisecracks and idle-chatter
not devoid of seditious propaganda But that can hardly provide any real
alternative to high culture; and no "civilized" person will take it seriously.
Aesop's biography is then effective only in repeating that learning is a kind
of imposture, solely designed to reinforce social predominance, and that by
itself it provides neither the right "ideas" nor the control of facts (Xanthos is
as bad a man of science as he is of action)".
283 ff., for the latter's deliberate use in his Golden Ass of popular materials akin to those of
the Life). Neither of them, however, seem to have exerted a direct influence on the image of
the Late Antiquity sophos.
73. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 11 29.
74. Lucian, A true Story II 15.
75. The tongue: Life chap. 51-55 and Plutarch, Dinner 146 f. To drink out the sea: Life chap. 68-
73 and Plutarch, Dinner 151 h-d.
76. Homo Ludens, 153.
77. See WINKLER, Auctor and Actor, 288 ff.
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We are now facing an unbridgeable gap between two different realms of
wisdom; but we are also coming to the point of understanding one possible
reason why play-knowledge should have been marginalised, after having
kept a propelling role in the culture of V Century B.C. Athens. This culture,
both a development of Presocratic modes of thinking, teaching and perfor-
ming and the jumping-board of Socratic and Platonic search for truth, had in
drama one of its main instruments of conception and expression. It was then
largely constructed on that interaction of "serious" and "playful" dynamics
which was fundamental in dramatic production (any tragic trilogy had origi-
nally to be completed by a satiric drama; tragedy became later the constant
reference of the comic parody; comedy itself mixed laughter and serious-
ness). Here wisdom could be enjoyable, popular, serious and creative all at
the same time. This interaction diffused a permanent intellectual stimulation
into the whole of the "political" body. The aim of the institutionalized mass-
media system centered on the Attic theatre could he shared also by Socrates:
both Xenophon and Plato agree in depicting this sophos as a quite ordinary
Athenian citizen, who had a particular talent of exploiting the possibilities of
the communication network typical of his polis for speculative and didactic
purposes, and could talk to anyone and be listened to by anybody willing to
do so-8; Plutarch still remembers that he took no offense for being satirized
by comedy, since for him theatre was "like a great symposion",9. No wonder
that in this Athens Aesop (the author of stories whose messages could be
understood universally, even by women"") was a paradigm of playful but
equally authoritative wisdom. And not only on the comic scene: Socrates,
while waiting to be put to death, still practised Sophia by versifying Aesopic
fables"' and improvising apologues on the Aesopic mode.
This fluidity between intellectual play and creation was suited to a compara-
tively homogeneous, predominantly oral cultural circuit, where the "intellec-
tuals" kept in mind that their own audience was the whole polis. Cultural
production was elaborated through playforms and diffused through a play-
structure; the whole polls acted as a play-community. Culture could then her
a serious matter to (potentially) anybody, because the overall playful mood
of its creation guaranteed free, universal access to it. The impulse to com-
pete on a general seriocomic mode must have been provided by the prospect
of addressing a large, socially and culturally stratified, yet deeply attentive
and motivated public; the very audience which, with an unprecedented de-
gree of "enthusiasm and partisanship", closely watched the duels for preemi-
nence taking place in the arena of Athenian politics".
78. Xen. Memoirs of Socrates 1 1.1; Plato, Apology of Socrates, 30a.
79. Plutarch, The Education of Children, 14, 10 d.
80. See Socrates' use of a fable, as described by Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, II 8, 13-14.
81. Plato, Phaedo 60 d. Socrates had presumably teamed Aesopic fables thanks to their wides-
pread oral diffusion.
82. .1j. WINKLES, "Laying down the Lawn: the Oversight of Men's Sexual Behaviour in Classical
Athens", in BeforeSexuality..., 197.
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The political community of Classical Athens provided a culturally homogene-
ous environment. But in I Century A.D. (and almost certainly since the Hel-
lenistic period) the possibility of such a universal audience was definitely
lost: even the Promethean efforts of Lucianic parody could be effective only
on a small, cultivated minority. From now on, there would be not one, but
two worlds of wisdom: "high", learned, mainly bookish culture on one side,
the side of prevailing seriousness and authentic science, and "popular",
mainly oral tradition on the other, the side of both laughter and ignorance.
Education stands in opposition to what must be called from now on "folk-
lore"; culture is an elitist notion; knowledge can always he a source of plea-
sure, but no longer be produced by play; phylosophy, the activity of theoreti-
cal contemplation, is restricted to the happy few.
One of Aristophanes' characters could assert that to ignore Aesop's wisdom
was to he "ignorant and stupid". The later scholiast's comment proves how
remote this evaluation sounds in Late Antiguity: "at that time, they took the
story-teller Aesop seriously""'. Seen from the upper side, by now, Aesop has
become at best the representative of an old, but definitely "minor" tradition
fo wisdom, and at worst a clown; seen from the lower, his old ludic and "So-
cratic" features have turned him into the hero of anti-culture. The fable, once
a universal means of thought, has been demoted to a "popular" genre. Play-
wisdom has become a contradiction in terms, and Huizinga will struggle to
reconstruct its broken unity. So Aesop, the master of play-knowledge, must
remain the last Mad Wise Man of Antiquity.
83. Aristophanes , Birds, v. 471 and echol. vet.: ton logopoion Aisopon dia spoudes eichon.
